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THE "DARDEN DILEMMA": SHOULD
AFRICAN AMERICANS PROSECUTE CRIMES?
Kenneth B. Nunn
W.E.B. Du Bois said that we were all of two worlds-part African
and part American. It is only in the middle where we can be free to
be both, to move in the world of American laws and culture without
forsaking our African heritage.'
Christopher Darden
INTRODUCTION
VERYONE knows who Christopher Darden is. Even now, years
after the O.J. Simpson murder trial made him a household name,
he remains a recognizable public figure. While his involvement in the
Simpson prosecution brought him fame, fortune, and professional
opportunities, Darden asserts that serving as a visible African
American prosecutor, who sought to convict a popular African
American sports figure, had its costs as well.2 According to Darden,
at least some members of the African American community view him
as a "sell-out"--one who allowed himself to be used to further white
interests for personal gain at the expense of the broader African
American community.'
In his account of the O.J. Simpson trial, Darden characterizes the
criticism and cold reception he received from the Black community as
misdirected racism.' From Darden's perspective, it was his dedication
to his role as a prosecutor that opened him up to this form of
criticism.5 By fulfilling his professional obligation to prosecute crimes
fairly, impartially, and without regard to race, Darden believes he
* Associate Dean for Law Center Affairs and Professor of Law, University of
Florida, Fredric G. Levin College of Law.
1. Christopher A. Darden with Jess Walter, In Contempt 382 (1996).
2. See id. at 170-73.
3. See id at 172.
4. See Margaret M. Russell, Beyond "Sellouts" and "Race Cards: Black
Attorneys and the Straitacket of Legal Practice, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 766, 781 (1997)
[hereinafter Russell, Beyond "Sellouts"]. According to Russell, Darden "seems to
view his dilemma as a dichotomous conflict of a Black prosecutor's loyalty to justice
versus obeisance to antiwhite racism in Black communities." Id. at 780-81.
5. See Darden, supra note 1, at 173.
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incurred the wrath of the African American community. 6
Christopher Darden has come to epitomize the burdens that
African American prosecutors face as they perform their professional
tasks. Moreover, the "Darden Dilemma" has become a generic term
for the anguish that these prosecutors endure as they negotiate
between competing allegiances to the African American community
and the State.7
Although Christopher Darden has lent this conflict his name, he is
not the first to experience it.8  Black prosecutors have long felt
compelled to defend their career choices against allegations of their
insensitivity to the needs of the African American community.9 Much
has been written about the sense of isolation that African American
prosecutors feel, and the commitment, or lack thereof, of African
American prosecutors to African American collective interests and
goals, has long been a topic of discussion within the African American
community.10
I can understand the hurt and isolation that Christopher Darden
must have felt as he confronted the conflict between his role as a
prosecutor and his obligations to the African American community.
Like Darden, I too believe it is important for African American
lawyers to "move in the world of American laws and culture without
forsaking our African heritage."" But this belief leads me to a
different conclusion than that reached by Darden. In my view, the
best resolution of the "Darden Dilemma" is for African Americans to
6. See id.
7. See id. at 383. According to Darden, the "Darden Dilemma" is a name some
Black prosecutors have for "the pressure they feel from those in the community who
criticize them for standing up and convicting [BIlack criminals." Id.
8. See, e.g., Constance Johnson, More Black Lawyers Work for the Prosecution
Team, Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 1995, at B1 [hereinafter Johnson, More Black] ("One
frustration of [a Black prosecutor's] job is that some [B]lacks view him as a traitor.
At a recent conference on youths and violence at a predominantly [B]lack community
college, members of the audience berated [the prosecutor] and other panelists. One
angry young man shouted: 'You guys aren't doing anything to help. You're part of an
institution that is oppressing us."'); Don Terry, Prosecutor Steps Softly in His New Job
in Bronx, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1989, at 23 (quoting a Black district attorney who stated
"I find when talking to minority law students that they don't feel that becoming
assistant district attorneys is politically righteous. They feel that working for the
prosecution is working against the community somehow.").
9. See id.
10. See Ellis Cose & Allison Samuels, The Darden Dilemma, Newsweek, Mar. 25,
1996, at 58; Benjamin A. Holden, Trying Times: A Black Prosecutor is Judged as He
Seeks Coviction of a Rap Star, Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 1996, at Al; James Varney, Few
Black Lawyers Work for DA's Office, Times-Picayune, Apr. 15, 1996, at Al; The
"Darden Dilemma" has even spawned a book of the same name, dealing with the
conflicts of African American prosecutors. See The Darden Dilemma: 12 Black
Writers on Justice, Race and Conflicting Loyalties x (Ellis Cose ed., 1997)
[hereinafter Darden Dilemma] (compiling twelve essays by "[B]lack thinkers" who
"grapple with various aspects of the 'Darden Dilemma"').
11. Darden, supra note 1, at 382.
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refrain from prosecuting crimes and to reject employment
opportunities with prosecutors' offices. I argue this, not because
Black prosecutors do not advantage society and the Black community
in particular, but because the harm their presence in prosecutors'
offices engenders outweighs any benefit.
I believe that the outcome I counsel here-that African Americans
not prosecute crimes-is both moral and ethical. I will make the case
for this finding below. First, however, it is important to examine the
contours of the "Darden Dilemma" and the precise nature of the
moral and ethical problems it presents.
Professor Margaret Russell has written a thoughtful and sensitive
analysis of the "Darden Dilemma" phenomenon. Professor Russell
rejects the viewpoint that the "Darden Dilemma" is caused by an
uninformed Black community that seeks to enforce lawless and
potentially racist values against diligent African American prosecutors
who are only doing their job, even when that job means incarcerating
African American defendants.13 The "Darden Dilemma," Russell
suggests, is better viewed as "an ongoing interplay of competing
values within Black attorneys who are attempting to puzzle through
the implications of their professional choices for the well-being of
Black communities." 14  Black prosecutors make these professional
choices, Russell rightly points out, in a world that is not of their
making.u Consequently, any discussion of the appropriateness of
their professional conduct must also take into account the constraints
within which they must operate.1 6
I agree, in part, with Russell's redefinition of the nature of the
"Darden Dilemma." Any discussion of the professional or ethical
obligations of the African American prosecutor must recognize that
Black prosecutors may face internal moral conflicts as they seek to
negotiate a space between seemingly competing professional and
community demands. Such a discussion must also be sensitive to the
fact that this negotiation takes place in a shifting landscape, the
parameters of which are not necessarily under the control of the
African American prosecutor nor the African American community.
"Darden Dilemmas" and their solutions are, admittedly, fluid, not
12. See Russell, Beyond "Sellouts," supra note 4, at 779-85.
13. See id at 781.
14. Id. at 784.
15. See id Russell states:
[T]he Black community did not create the Darden Dilemma, nor did
Christopher Darden or Black prosecutors generally. Rather, it is an
unavoidable structural component of a legal system originated and
maintained under racial hierarchy. Armed with this revelation, Black
attorneys can be empowered to expand their choices, rather than be
relegated to them.
Id.
16. See id at 788.
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static. Whether a given prosecutor can be said to promote or retard
the interests of the African American community, and whether the
African American community has fairly or unfairly injected its
interests in a given case, is a nuanced and complicated question. And
it is one that cannot be reduced merely to a scorecard analysis that
simply records the race of those charged.
Unlike Russell, I do not think that the ethical issue inherent in the
"Darden Dilemma" can be reduced simply to a matter of the internal
moral conflicts that African American prosecutors must face. For
Russell, the most insidious aspect of the "Darden Dilemma" is that it
limits the individual choice of the Black prosecutor.17 She writes that
"[s]tereotypical, externally imposed assumptions about the role and
function of Black attorneys have the powerful effect of straitjacketing
and asphyxiating Blacks in an already highly restrictive
environment."'8 In Russell's view, Black prosecutors trapped within
the "Darden Dilemma" can only choose between two equally
unappealing alternatives: being branded a "sell-out," or being accused
of recklessly "playing the race card."' 9 The "Darden Dilemma," as
she characterizes it, is the result of the "inner tension" occasioned by
this limited choice. 0
I think there is an external dimension to this debate. The dilemma
faced by Black prosecutors is not a dilemma merely because of the
individualized decisions that they must make. Those decisions pose a
dilemma only because of the differing costs and benefits of one choice
over the other, costs and benefits which must be assessed in a given
contextual setting. Black prosecutors are only confronted with a
dilemma if the African American community defines its interests in a
17. See id. at 771-72. Russell argues that Black attorneys, unlike their white
counterparts, "face an unduly restrictive set of choices, each of which carries
impossible burdens." Id. at 771. This restrictive set of choices, of which the "Darden
Dilemma" is exemplary, is what Russell finds problematic with the condition of Black
attorneys in general. See id. at 771-72. In her view, "[tihe Black attorney generally is
not accorded the respect, autonomy, or even anonymity enjoyed by her white
colleagues, and she is therefore doubly disadvantaged by the imposition of careerist
pigeonholes and expectations." Id. at 772.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 773.
20. Id. at 784. According to Russell, this "inner tension may be influenced,
heightened, and at times... exacerbated by Black community critiques, but it is
inherently and inevitably a result of a legal system that devalues all Black lives,
including the token Black attorneys it ostensibly valorizes as the honored few." Id. In
Russell's view, it is white society that creates the "Darden Dilemma" by restricting
the ability of African American attorneys to respond to the needs of their
communities. See id. at 781-82. She writes:
[I]t is my view that racism severely limits the public credibility and lawyering
choices of Black attorneys not only in a vertical, ladder-climbing, "glass
ceiling" career sense, but also in terms of the latitude and autonomy that
they are accorded in juggling and reconciling competing obligations to Black
communities and to the legal profession at large.
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way that calls into question the ordinary professional expectations of
prosecutors. In any moral debate in which the interests of the Black
community are implicated, there must be a place for that community
to express its point of view. The Black community has the right to
determine the proper moral conduct of its members and to enforce
that conduct as the price of membership. This is a matter of self-
determination. To argue otherwise is to challenge the legitimacy of
the African American community itself, a nonnegotiable position
from an African American point of view.
Although questions of the ethical and moral dilemmas faced by
African American prosecutors are indeed difficult, they are not
impossible to resolve. For instance, Professor David Wilkins shows
that even Professor Russell's nuanced construction of the "Darden
Dilemma" does not prevent her from asking whether Christopher
Darden's behavior in the Simpson case was acceptable on the merits2 '
As Professor Wilkins demonstrates, one's concern with avoiding
totalizing positions and essentializing labels should not prevent one
from asking important questions.22 By framing the "Darden
Dilemma" as a conflict caused by constraining individual choice,
Russell evades the questions of whether the prosecution of crimes
inflicts harm on the Black community and if so whether the Black
community can consequently impose demands on African American
prosecutors.
I think these questions are worth asking. Of course, in order to
pose any important question, one must disclose one's assumptions and
ground the question in an appropriate context. I would phrase the
question posed by the "Darden Dilemma" in this way: at this moment
in history, given current political realities, the social milieu in which
people of African descent exist in the United States, and the
limitations in which Black prosecutors must operate, should African
Americans prosecute crimes?
Most commentaries on the "Darden Dilemma," including those by
Russell and Wilkins, do not squarely treat this question33 They, like
21. See David B. Wilkins, Straightfacketing Professionalism A Comment on
Russell, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 795, 796 (1997) [hereinafter Wilkins, Straighacketing].
Indeed, Wilkins goes on to question the conduct of Mr. Darden in the Simpson case.
See id. at 807-19. Furthermore, he makes value judgments about Mr. Darden's
conduct using the concepts Russell has provided. See id.
22- See id. at 796 (stating that evaluating Darden's conduct "on the merits"
reduces the likelihood that an essentialist outcome will ensue).
23. See Russell, Beyond "Sellouts," supra note 4, at 782-83 (suggesting that claims
that criminal prosecution, or other "career path[s] not typically associated with the
pursuit of racial justice," are counter to the interests of the Black community and
unnecessarily stereotype and pigeonhole African American attorneys who choose
these forms of legal practice). Although Wilkins argues that the charge that Black
prosecutors work against the cause of racial justice is "speculative" and "contingent,"
he too does not address my question. See Wilkins, Straightjacketing, supra note 21, at
803 n38. Wilkins does contend, however, that the United States is not a regime like
2000] 1477
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others, assume that it is not a serious question and that any such
demands that African American community members place on
African American prosecutors as members of that community are
illegitimate. Most often, this is so because the community pressure at
the core of the "Darden Dilemma" is treated as a vulgar exercise of
racial politics. 24  Insofar as professional ethics go, a "Darden
Dilemma" so defined is no dilemma at all. There is no professional
reason why prosecutors should follow the lawless demands of an
uninformed and self-interested mob.
Many commentators insist on framing the discussion this way.25
This is overly simplistic, and in the end, it is merely an inelegant
attempt to justify and privilege conduct that favors the State and
authoritarian values. Few would argue that African Americans
should not prosecute other African Americans simply because of the
affinities of race. But whether it is in the interest of the African
American community for African Americans to prosecute crimes
against African American defendants is a different question. In this
context it is not simply the race of the actors which is important, but
how the interests of the African American community are
conceptualized and defined. To put it another way, whether African
Americans should prosecute crimes is a political question and a moral
issue, not simply a question of racial allegiance.
In this Article, I argue that African Americans should not prosecute
crimes. I make this argument because I believe that when African
Americans prosecute crimes, they do extensive and avoidable harm to
the African American community. The contours of my argument are
simple: (1) the criminal justice system is racist and oppressive to
African American people; (2) prosecutors are a major source of the
racism found in the criminal justice system; (3) African American
prosecutors cannot eliminate the racism in the criminal justice system
by themselves; and (4) African Americans should not contribute to
the oppression of other African American people.
Part I of this Article evaluates the effects of the criminal justice
system on the African American community.26 Part II, discusses the
role that prosecutors play in the overrepresentation of African
Nazi Germany or apartheid South Africa where African Americans would have no
moral obligation to honor professional norms. See id. at 799. This would imply that
there would be no inherent moral barrier to representing the state as a prosecutor.
24. See Russell, Beyond "Sellouts," supra note 4, at 781 (describing the
"hyperbolic and at times contemptuous public commentary that helped construct the
Darden Dilemma: the brave, law-abiding Black prosecutor versus the Simpson-loving,
lawless Black community").
25. See generally id.
26. I speak of African Americans because that is the community of which I am a
member and of which I know best. I believe much of what I say is also relevant to
Latino/as, Native Americans, Asians, and other people of color who are political
minorities in United States, although I do not claim to speak for these groups.
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Americans in the criminal justice system and the prosecutors'
response to such overrepresentation. Furthermore, Part II evaluates
the desirability of this response from an ethical standpoint. Part III
considers the African American prosecutor's obligations to the Black
community. Finally, Part IV suggests a resolution to the "Darden
Dilemma."
I. "DOING GOOD BY DOING VIOLENCE": THE NEGATIVE IMPACT
OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM ON THE AFRICAN AMERICAN
COMMUNITY
In my view, there is no doubt that the criminal justice system is
racist.27 Not only is it racist, but arguably it is one of the most racist
27. The observation that the criminal justice system is racist has been made many
times. See generally David Cole, No Equal Justice: Race and Class in the American
Criminal Justice System 5 (1999) ("[Olur criminal justice system... is in fact
predicated on the exploitation of inequality."); Daniel Georges-Abeyie, The Criminal
Justice System and Minoities-A Review of the Literature in The Crininal Justice
System and Blacks 128 (Daniel Georges-Abeyie ed., 1984) (arguing that the criminaljustice system is intentionally racist); Coramae Richey Mann, Unequal Justice: A
Question of Color 23-24 (1993) (arguing that it is unreasonable to "deny that there is
racism in the criminal justice system, a system that has always been oppressive and
repressive toward minorities"); Jerome G. Miller, Search and Destroy: African-
American Males in the Criminal Justice System (1996) (rejecting the hypothesis that
the American criminal justice system is uninfluenced by race); 2 Gunnar Myrdal, An
American Dilemma (1964) (proposing that American society discriminates against
Blacks in the administration of justice); Race and Criminal Justice (Michael J. Lynch
& E. Britt Patterson eds., 1991) (describing an institutionalized bias in laws and
policies to the detriment of the minority community); Race, Crime, and Justice
(Barbara A. Hudson ed., 1996) (compiling a series of articles describing the American
criminal justice system as racist); Katheryn K. Russell, The Color of Crime: Racial
Hoaxes, White Fear, Black Protectionism, Police Harassment, and Other
Macroaggressions xiv (1998) [hereinafter Russell, The Color of Crime] (exploring the
"images and realities of crime and race"); Michael Tonry, Malign Neglect-Race,
Crime, and Punishment in America 3 (1995) (noting that "no one denies there is bias
in the system"); U.S. National Minority Advisory Council on Criminal Justice, The
Inequality of Justice: A Report on Crime and the Administration of Justice in the
Minority Community (U.S. Dep't of Justice 1982) [hereinafter National Minority]
(describing racism as a basic cause of conflict and disorder in the American criminal
justice system); Samuel Walker et al., The Color of Justice: Race, Ethnicity, and
Crime in America 2 (2d ed. 2000) ("In short, on both sides of the color line there is
suspicion and fear: a sense of injustice on the part of racial minorities and fear of
[B]lack crime on the part of whites."); Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification:
Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 Yale L.J. 677 (1995) [hereinafter
Butler, Racially Based] (arguing that Black jurors should emancipate non-violent
Black law-breakers in order to lessen the negative effect of incarceration on the Black
community); Developments in the Law: Race and the Criminal Process, 101 Harv. L
Rev. 1472 (1988) [hereinafter Developments] (examining "the constitutional problem
of race discrimination in criminal justice institutions"); Chris Weaver & Will Purcell,
Comment, The Prison Industrial Complex: A Modern Justification for African
Enslavement?, 41 How. L.J. 349 (1998) (contending that "the prison industrial
complex is a continuation of the legacy of slavery").
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institutions in the United States.2 As such, it is one of the principal
causes of racism elsewhere in society, since it provides legitimacy and
cover to racist ideas and behaviors. 29 The criminal justice system is
racist both in the treatment it affords to African Americans and in the
attitudes of its participants. Sometimes, the racism of the criminal
justice system is motivated by maliciousness ° and sometimes by
"benign neglect."31 Sometimes, the racist attitudes of actors in the
criminal justice system are wholly unconscious. 2 Whatever the
motivation, the negative impact on the African American community
is well-known and well-documented even as it goes, by and large,
28. See Ali Khan, Lessons From Malcolm X. Freedom By Any Means Necessary,
38 How. L.J. 79, 91-110 (1994) (describing how domination and control of the legal
system "provides a legal framework to institute even the most extreme forms of
subjugation").
29. The criminal justice system is the source of powerful stereotypes of Black
dangerousness that define and shape how other individuals and institutions respond
to people of African descent. See Miller, supra note 27, at 149 ("Replete with images
of dark-skinned predators, crime has become a metaphor for race, hammered home
nightly on TV news and exploitative crime shows."); Patricia J. Williams, Meditations
on Masculinity, in Constructing Masculinity 242 (Maurice Berger et al. eds., 1995)
("[A]ny [B]lack criminal becomes all [B]lack men, and the fear of all [B]iack men
becomes the rallying point for controlling all [B]lack people."); Joan W. Howarth,
Representing Black Male Innocence, 1 J. Gender, Race & Just. 97, 106 (1997) ("[T]he
deeply embedded idea of a frightening Black man has some influence on every person
in America .... "). Dorothy Roberts writes powerfully of the way that the presumed
criminality of African Americans reinforces racial stereotypes and leads to the
derogation of Black rights. Racial discrimination by the law enforcement community
informs the broader society that "Blacks are presumed to be lawless and are entitled
to fewer liberties." Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social
Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 775,810 (1999)
(Supreme Court Review) [hereinafter Roberts, Foreword]. Speaking of the social
consequences of police harassment of African Americans through "order-
maintenance" or "quality of life" policing, Roberts makes this observation:
In addition to reinforcing racist norms of presumed criminality, order-
maintenance policing intensifies racial inequalities in the protection of civil
liberties. Distinguishing between citizens on the basis of presumed
criminality permits the state to minimize the rights of presumably lawless
citizens while expanding the authority of presumably law-abiding ones.
Id. at 811; see also Cole, supra note 27, at 177 ("That crime has a young [B]lack man's
face in our culture has, tragically, made it easier to justify our collective failure to
respond adequately to past and ongoing inequality within and beyond the criminal
justice system.").
30. See Tonry, supra note 27, at 104 (suggesting Reagan advisors cynically planned
the war on drugs even though they knew the African American community would be
adversely and disproportionately affected).
31. The term "benign neglect" was first used in the race relations context in a 1970
memorandum written by then Assistant Secretary of Labor Daniel Patrick Moynihan
to President Nixon suggesting that the federal government adopt a "hands-off" policy
toward the enforcement of civil rights laws. See Charles Sumner Stone, Jr.,
Thucydides' Law of History, or from Kerner, 1968 to Hacker, 1992, 71 N.C. L. Rev.
1711, 1719 (1993).
32. See generally Sheri Lynn Johnson, Comment, Unconscious Racism and the
Criminal Law, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 1016 (1988) [hereinafter Johnson, Unconscious]




The United States incarcerates a greater percentage of its
population than any other nation.' A wildly disproportionate
number of those imprisoned are African Americans. 5 African
Americans are roughly twelve percent of the national population.
Yet, African Americans constitute more than fifty percent of the
inmates held in prisons and jails in the United States.' In some urban
areas, more than one half of the Black male population is serving
sentences in institutions, or are on probation or parole. 3 No country
could long survive with such a high percentage of its population
languishing behind bars. One can only imagine what the United
States would be like if one half of the white male population was
subject to such restraints38
The effects of such a high rate of incarceration have been extremely
debilitating to the African American community. 39 These effects
include the loss of male role models and fathers for African American
youths;' the loss of husbands and male companions for African
American women;41 the loss of earnings and wealth for the African
33. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
34. See Michael E. Tigar, Essay, Defending, 74 Tex. L Rev. 101, 105 (1995).
35. See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, Prison Population Growing Although Crime Rate
Drops, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1998, at A18 (finding that in 1996 the incarceration rate
for Black men was eight times the rate for white men).
36. See id. (reporting figures for 1996 that show that 526,200 African American
men and 510,900 white men are in prison).
37. See The Real War on Crime: The Report of the National Criminal Justice
Commission 102 (Steven R. Donziger ed., 1996) (finding that 56% of African
American males ages 18-35 in Baltimore are under some form of criminal supervision
(citing Jerome G. Miller, Hobbling a Generation: Young African-American Males in
the Criminal Justice System of America's Cities: Baltimore, Maryland (Sept. 1992));
see also Marc Mauer & Tracy Huling, Young Black Americans and the Criminal
Justice System: Five Years Later, The Sentencing Project, Oct. 1, 1995, at 1
(reporting that almost one quarter of African American males nationwide between
the ages of 20 and 29 are incarcerated, on probation, or on parole).
38. Indeed, such a possibility would be unimaginable. See Cole, supra note 27, at 8
("[I]t is unimaginable that our country's heavy reliance on incarceration would be
tolerated if the [B]lack/white incarceration rates were reversed ....").
39. See generally Marc Mauer, Intended and Unintended Consequences: State
Racial Disparities in Imprisonment, The Sentencing Project, Jan. 1997, at 1
(suggesting the need to consider new approaches to fighting crime because of the
"degree to which the criminal justice system now affects the African-American
community"); Justin Brooks & Kimberly Bahna, "It's a Family Affair--The
Incarceration of the American Family: Confronting Legal and Social Issues, 28 U.S.F.
L. Rev. 271 (1994) (describing the "devastating" effects of incarceration on families);
Anthony E. 0. King, The Impact of Incarceration on African American Families:
Implications for Practice, 74 Families in Soc'y: J. Contemp. Hum. Servs. 145 (1993)
(same).
40. This is particularly damaging because prior incarceration of a parent is a
strong predictor that the child will be incarcerated as an adult. See Brooks & Bahna,
supra note 39, at 282.
41. See Paul Butler, (Color) Blind Faith: The Tragedy of Race Crime, and the
Law, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1270, 1280 (1998) (book review) [hereinafter Butler, (Color)
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American community;42 the loss of membership of important African
American organizations and institutions; the preclusion of the
educational and the social development of the incarcerated; and the
encouragement of the spread of AIDS.43 Indeed, arguably, the
incarceration of such large numbers of black prisoners is, in itself, an
indication of genocide.
The disproportionate incarceration of African Americans can be
traced to racial disparities existing at all levels of the criminal
process." African Americans are imprisoned at greater rates because
they are subjected to disparate treatment at each stage of the
prosecution, from detention and arrest to charging, plea bargaining,
trial, and sentencing.45 These disparities are part of an overall racist
pattern, a pattern that is dependant on the racist beliefs and practices
of a wide variety of actors in the criminal justice process-including
legislators, police officers, prosecutors, and judges.46
A. Racial Bias in the Laws
There are many laws in effect that disproportionately impact
African American communities and lead to greater numbers of
African Americans in the criminal justice system. 47  The most
notorious example of this phenomenon is the federal sentencing
scheme for the distribution of cocaine. 4  Although there is no
physiological difference in the effects of cocaine, penalties for the
distribution of crack cocaine are far harsher than penalties for the
distribution of powder cocaine.49 A person sentenced for possession
with intent to distribute crack cocaine would need to possess one
hundred times more powder cocaine to receive the same sentence.",
Because African Americans are more likely to use crack cocaine than
powder cocaine, disparity in sentencing leads to a disproportionate
impact on the African American community. 1 One cannot speculate
Blind].
42. See id.
43. See Mann, supra note 27, at 227-29.
44. See Angela J. Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the Criminal Justice System,
94 Mich. L. Rev. 1660, 1675 (1996) (book review) [hereinafter Davis, Benign] ("There
is. .. ample evidence that racism plays a role at every stage of the criminal process.").
45. See Mann, supra note 27, at 166-200.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 129 ("[I)t is reasonably argued not only that many American
criminal laws were devised expressly for ... minorities, but also that criminal laws not
specifically addressed to them were more frequently applied to them.").
48. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1994) (describing penalties for possessing
cocaine with intent to distribute).
49. See Nkechi Taifa, Cracked Justice: A Critical Examination of Cocaine
Sentencing, 27 U. West. L.A. L. Rev. 109, 129-37 (1996).
50. See id. at 110, 118.
51. See id. at 121-28.
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why this sentencing disparity was enacted initially.5 There may be
many competing reasons for structuring the law in this manner
However, one can comment on the fact that the disparity was not
corrected when the deleterious impact on the African American
community was disclosed. 54
More generally, the entire structure of criminal laws operates in a
way that ensures a racially disproportionate impact. The criminal law,
as a whole, is disproportionately directed at street crime while the
crimes of the wealthy, or so-called "white-collar crimes," are virtually
ignored.' Another way of putting this is that activities that African
Americans are more likely to engage in are those that are more likely
to be criminalized.56 This relationship is far from accidental. Virtually
everywhere, criminal law is used as a means of controlling
subordinated populations.' In Europe, whence the American system
52. One commentator, Randall Kennedy, points out that although the crack
cocaine disparity is offered as evidence of racial discrimination in the administration
of the law, no showing has been made that Congress intended to discriminate against
African Americans in legislating the distinction between crack and powder cocaine.
See Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law 376 (1997) [hereinafter Kennedy,
Race].
53. It could very well be that Congress believed, erroneously as it turns out, that
crack cocaine was distinguishable from powder cocaine due to its potency, cost, or
social impact. See Taifa, supra note 49, at 128-43. Eric Sterling, former counsel to the
House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, testified before Congress in 1994 that the
crack cocaine disparity was motivated in part by the mistaken belief that basketball
star Len Bias died from a crack cocaine overdose. See Proceedings and Debates on
Criminal Sentencing, 140 Cong. Rec. S12478-021, S12479 (1994) (statement of Sen.
Simon). Sterling also testified that "the 100:1 cocaine to crack ratio... was originally
a 50:1 ratio in the Crime Subcommittee's bill, H.R. 5394, and was arbitrarily doubled
simply to symbolize redoubled congressional seriousness." Taifa, supra note 49, at 121
n.78.
54. See Taifa, supra note 49, at 111-17.
55. See Tonry, supra note 27, at 96.
56. Dorothy Roberts would take this observation one step further. She argues
that criminal law is not only disproportionately directed at people of color, but that
the very meaning of crime is racially determined:
Not only is race used in identifying criminals, it is also used in defining
crime. In other words, race does more than predict a person's propensity for
committing neutrally-defined offenses. Race is built into the normative
foundation of the criminal law. Race becomes part of society's
determination of which conduct to define as criminal. Crime is actually
contructed [sic] according to race.
Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 67 Tul. L Rev. 1945, 1954
(1993) [hereinafter Roberts, Crime] (citation omitted).
57. The reliance on criminal law as an instrumentality of control is an extension of
the hierarchical character of most societies. Criminologists Chambliss and Seidman
emphasize this point. They state:
In all societies, regardless of how the interests groups vary in number, those
which are most likely to be effective are the ones that control the economic
or political institutions of the society. The most influential groups will of
course be those which control both. As a consequence, legislation typically
favors the wealthier, the more politically active groups in the society.
William J. Chambliss and Robert B. Seidman, Law, Order, and Power 65 (1971); see
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of criminal justice was derived, criminal laws were used to control the
poor. 8 Likewise, in the United States, criminal laws developed
mainly as a means to control the enslaved population, Native
Americans and the poor.59 That the pattern would continue into
present times is not surprising, since "the dominant experience has
been one in which the law acted as the vehicle by which the
generalized racism in the society was made particular and converted
into standards and policies of subjugation and social control."'
According to the National Minority Advisory Council on Criminal
Justice:
America stands as a distinctive example of ethnic, religious, and
linguistic pluralism, but it is also a classic example of the heavy-
handed use of state and private power to control minorities and
suppress their continuing opposition to the influence of white racist
ideology.61
Consequently, the selection of appropriate problems for the
application of state violence focuses almost entirely on crimes that
threaten the wealthy and powerful, and rarely on crimes that target
the poor and the Black (other than crimes of physical violence that
other poor or Black people are likely to commit).62 Thus, bouncing a
also Joseph F. Sheley, America's "Crime Problem:" An Introduction to Criminology
67 (1985) (finding that what we consider as a crime "at any given time reflect[s] the
work of various interest groups within society's current power structure"); Kenneth B.
Nunn, The Trial as Text. Allegory, Myth and Symbol in the Adversarial Criminal
Process-A Critique of the Role of the Public Defender and a Proposal for Reform, 32
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 743, 760 (1995) [hereinafter Nunn, Trial as Text] (describing the
definition of crime as an end product of cultural struggle between competing groups).
58. See generally Douglas Hay, Property, Authority, and the Criminal Law in
Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England 25-26
(Douglas Hay et al. eds., 1975) (describing the English criminal law as a social
institution manipulated by the ruling classes and used to protect property and assert
dominion over the "mass of unpropertied Englishmen"); Richard A. Posner, Anl
Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1193, 1204-05 (1985)
("[T]he criminal law is designed primarily for the nonaffluent; the affluent are kept in
line, for the most part by tort law.").
59. See Mann, supra note 27, at 161, 165. For a discussion of how the criminal law
was enlisted as a means to control Black populations following slavery, see Noel C.
Richardson, Is There A Current Incarceration Crisis in the Black Community? An
Analysis of the Link Between Confinement, Capital, and Racism in the United States,
23 New. Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 183, 199-211 (1997). Richardson notes
that after Southern states passed laws "criminalizing hunting, fishing, and grazing of
livestock to prevent [B]lacks from obtaining subsistence and to increase the likelihood
of petty thievery," the percentage of African Americans in prison increased by a
third. Id. at 210 n.213 and accompanying text.
60. Haywood Burns, Black People and the Tyranny of American Law, 407 Annals
Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 156, 157 (1973).
61. National Minority, supra note 27, at xv.
62. The criminal justice system is simply the most efficacious means of preserving
the power and pursuing the interests of dominant groups. Marxists have long argued
that crime was the outgrowth of capitalistic exploitation, and criminal law the
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check is a crime, whereas overcharging for retail goods is not, and
although racial discrimination is widespread by any objective measure,
there is no rush to criminalize discriminatory conduct, such as failing
to rent an apartment to an otherwise qualified African American
applicant.
The government's ill-advised "War on Drugs" demonstrates the
carelessness with which state violence is wielded when African
American interests are at stake. In the early 1980's, the Reagan
administration began a concentrated effort to target the distribution
and use of illegal drugs in the United States.63 These efforts resulted
in increased penalties for drug possession and sales, stepped-up
interdiction efforts, harsher prosecution policies, and increased police
searches and seizures.6' These policies funneled more and more
people into the criminal justice system.' Yet, ultimately this
concentrated effort had little effect on the amount of drug use or the
amount of drugs brought into the country.66 The War on Drugs did
result in many more African American males going to jail, greater
violence as the transaction costs of the drug trade skyrocketed, and
greater police repression, at least as a perceived phenomenon, in the
Black community.67  The sad part of this tale is that these
consequences were entirely anticipated by policy makers in the
Reagan administration.68 It was well understood that the war on drugs
expression of capitalist values and agendas. In Marxist ideology:
Criminal law is used by the state and the ruling class to secure the survival of
the capitalist system, and, as capitalist society is further threatened by its
own contradictions, criminal law will be increasingly used in the attempt to
maintain domestic order. The underclass ... will continue to be the object
of crime control as long as the dominant class seeks to perpetuate itself, that
is, as long as capitalism exists.
Mann, supra note 27, at 128 (quoting Richard Quinney, Class, State and Crime 86
(1977)). In response to this perspective, Mann makes the point that people of color
are, for the most part, synonymous with the underclass in American society and thus
are most often the targets of the criminal law. As she put it:
Since the American 'underclass' has always had a disproportionate share of
racial minorities within its ranks, it is reasonably argued not only that many
American criminal laws were devised expressly for these minorities, but also
that criminal laws not specifically addressed to them were more frequently
applied to them.
Id at 129.
63. See Tonry, supra note 27, at 82-83. The Bush administration continued and
expanded the Reagan-launched "War on Drugs." See id. at 83.
64. See Randy E. Barnett, Bad Trip: Drug Prohibition and te lVeakness of Public
Policy, 103 Yale LJ. 2593, 2611-13 (1994) (book review). See also Stephen A.
Saltzburg, Another Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth Ainendinent (As Illustrated
by the Open Fields Doctrine), 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 4,23 (1986) (arguing that the "War
on Drugs" is eroding Fourth Amendment principles).
65. See Barnett, supra note 64, at 2611-13.
66. See Tonry, supra note 27, at 119-20.
67. See id. at 81-83.
68. See id. at 4, 104.
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would have devastating effects on the African American community.69
Still, the decision was made to go ahead, notwithstanding the
consequences, because political advantage outweighed whatever harm
the African American community might endure.7 °
B. Criminal Justice as Flawed Social Policy
The criminal justice system uses violence more than anything else to
solve the problems it encounters.71 Seeking a solution to a problem
through the use of criminal law involves a commitment to using
violence.7" We must commit to using violence in order to solve some
problems, like drunk driving. When solving other problems, like
everyday racism, we do not commit to using violence because we do
not see the problem as that serious, or we think it is not so easily
solved through such means.73 The choice to use criminal law as the
preferred societal means of problem-solving is a social policy choice
that, for the most part, is not made by the African American
community.74 The particular mix of solutions that takes place within
the system, including retribution or rehabilitation, involves choices
that Blacks do not make.75 Why is the white community exacting
retribution against us in the first place when the blame for the
condition is not ours?76
69. See id.
70. See id. at 123.
71. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986)
(arguing that judicial acts "signal and occasion the imposition of violence upon
others").
72. See id.
73. See Jan Alan Neiger, Campus Hate Speech on Trial By Timothy C. Shiell,
United Press of Kansas, 1998, 28 J.L. & Educ. 304, 306-07 (1999) (book review)
(analogizing campus solutions to hate speech with solutions to racism).
74. As to the absence of Black input into social policy, Mann notes that "African
American and other racial minorities lack adequate representation as lawmakers, and
laws are made subsequently by persons who are not members of the groups directly
involved .... "Mann, supra note 27, at 161.
75. See id. It is not only true that African Americans are underrepresented in
state and federal legislatures, but they are also underrepresented in the ranks of
judges charged with the responsibility of pronouncing sentences. See id. at 161-62.
76. David Cole argues that the preoccupation with individual responsibility is a
flaw that is inherent to our criminal justice system and grows out of the system's
preference for "formal equality over any kind of substantive equality." David Cole,
What's Criminology Have To Do With It?, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1605, 1612 (1996). Cole
notes:
If a [B]lack child growing up in Brooklyn's East New York has
substantially fewer opportunities for escaping criminal activity than a white
child raised on Manhattan's Upper East Side, is it fair to treat them
identically? Shouldn't we say that the Upper East Side child who violates
the law is more culpable than the East New York child? If they receive the
same punishment for the same behavior, have they really been treated
equally? But if we punish them differently, have we not departed from the
formal equality that seems critical to the criminal justice system?
The more we understand about the particular background of an offender,
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When faced with evidence of the disproportionate arrest of African
Americans, defenders of the police point out that African Americans
are involved in crime at greater rates than other sectors of the
population.77 This claim is overstated. 8 Mann points out that when
one focuses on patterns of offending, African American criminality is
no different from that exhibited by other populations. 9 To the extent
that more African Americans do offend, that difference is offset by
the greater numbers of African Americans that are arrestedl Even if
African Americans do offend at higher rates one must ask why this is
so. Why are so many African Americans involved in crime? Is it
simply that African Americans are genetically or culturally different
from whites? Or is it that the greater rate of offending is a
consequence of the conditions that African Americans endure?
Poverty and marginalization lead to crime." According to James
the more we are likely to understand what "caused" him or her to commit a
crime. However, the criminal law by and large does not take subjective
individual circumstances into account, short of rather rare defenses like
duress or insanity. Instead, responsibility is tied to acts, and offenders who
commit such acts are, at least in theory, to be treated similarly. The recent
trend toward guideline sentencing and mandatory minimums reflects a
further effort to strip away all consideration of the individual offender, and
to predicate punishment solely on conduct. But where individuals are not in
fact similarly situated, treating them identically is not the same as treating
them equally.
Id.
77. See, eg., William Wilbanks, The Myth of a Racist Criminal Justice System at
vii (1987) (proposing that evidence of racism in the criminal justice system is weak
and contradictory).
78. Claims that African Americans engage in criminal activity at a greater
proportional rate are usually grounded on statistics which purport to show that
African Americans are arrested with more frequency than others. See Mann, supra
note 27, at 37. But these figures may be inflated because of over-reporting of crimes
committed by Blacks, the over-policing of Black communities, counting multiple
charges against a single individual as multiple arrests, and undercounting the Black
population so the per capita rate of crime appears to be higher. See id. at 32-35; see
also Davis, Benign, supra note 44, at 1675-77 (tracing disproportionate arrest statistics
to unwarranted police suspicion of Blacks).
79. See Mann, supra note 27, at 39. Mann notes that the difference between cross-
race comparisons and intra-race comparisons is significant when examining whether
African Americans are more likely to commit violent offenses. For example,
although African Americans constituted 46.5% of persons arrested for violent crimes
in 1986, these arrests totaled less than 8% of African American arrests. See id. The
African American percentage of violent arrests is comparable to the percentages of
other racial groups. See id. at 44-45. Consequently, although some believe African
Americans disproportionately commit violent crimes, "the proportions of each type of
crime do not vary substantially between minorities, or between minorities and
whites." Id- at 45.
80. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
81. Indeed African Americans have gone "from an 'historical state of oppression'
to one of uselessness. This increasing economic obsolescence has served as one of the
primary sources of increased criminal activity and incarceration in the [B]lack
community." See Richardson, supra note 59, at 195-96. Of course a rigorous analysis
of the problem would ask why there is so much poverty in the African American
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Vorenberger, Harvard law professor and former head of President
Johnson's Crime Commission, "the most significant action that can be
taken against crime is action designed to eliminate slums and ghettos,
to improve education, to provide jobs, to make sure that every
American is given the opportunities and freedoms that will enable
him to assume his responsibilities."'  This advice, however, has never
been taken. The poor are the targets of the criminal justice system,
and their behavior is criminalized. Poor people often do not have the
social resources to live productive lives that keep them out of
trouble.83 For instance, the poor have fewer coping skills and fewer
role models.'
Crime among the poor and the socially marginalized is not
unexpected. Does it come as any surprise that people who have
nothing steal and that people who are taught not to value their own
lives do not value the lives of others like them?15 The root cause of so
much criminal behavior seems entirely predictable. 6 Yet nothing is
done to eliminate the known social causes of crime. There is no
serious attempt to eradicate poverty.' Job training, conflict
resolution, self-esteem, and conscious-raising programs in
impoverished communities are lacking. Instead, we have been offered
a mythology of personal responsibility that simply serves to justify the
use of state violence against the defenseless. 8 Society as a whole does
community and why that community is so marginalized. One commentator answers
the question bluntly. According to Professor Butler, "the best explanation of
disproportionate [B]lack criminality is white racism." Butler, (Color) Blind, supra
note 41, at 1281 (discussing Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime and the Law (1997)).
82. Miller, supra note 27, at 170 (quoting James Vorenburg).
83. See Nichola L. Marshall, The Welfare Reform Act of 1996: Political
Compromise or Panacea for Welfare Dependency?, 4 Geo. J. on Fighting Poverty 333,
337 (1997) ("Poverty stems from both a lack of marketable skills and insufficient
employment opportunities.").
84. See id. at 336-37.
85. Amos Wilson argues that Black-on-Black criminals imitate white racists and
that African Americans who prey on their own community are "the supreme White
racist[s] and White [S]upremacist[s]." Amos N. Wilson, Black-on-Black Violence:
The PsychoDynamics of Black Self-Annihilation in Service of White Domination 73
(1990) (emphasis omitted).
86. See Joseph F. Sheley, Structural Influences on the Problem of Race, Crime, and
Criminal Justice Discrimination, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 2273, 2289 (1993) [hereinafter Sheley,
Structural]. Sheley argues:
"[High crime periods" seem generally correlated with economic hard times
and with majority attempts to scapegoat minorities-economic "parasites"-
as the source of the hard times. The criminal justice system is pressured to
control those segments of the population behind, or those who are perceived
as threatening because of, current economic woes.
Id.
87. See id. at 2291 (suggesting "that fundamental changes in income, welfare,
employment, education, and health care policy are necessary" to reduce crime).
88. See id. ("[T]he ultimate causes of criminal behavior were not society's but the




nothing until a poor person commits a crime. Then, punitive
strategies come into play, and this effect is exacerbated as policy-
makers retreat further and further from rehabilitative goals.,
Reliance on the criminal justice system to manage problems caused
by social inequities seems both inefficient and unfair. Such reliance is
inefficient because it fails to address the source of the crime. Rather,
a cycle of pain is established that simply sends new generations of
oppressed people into the criminal process. The criminal justice
system is also unfair. It is unfair to so-called criminals because they
never get a chance to live wholesome, productive lives. It is unfair to
the African American community because the system imposes policy
decisions that fail to acknowledge and correct the community's
subjugated status.
In addition, the human needs of the African American community
are not met and it remains, by and large, the target of criminal activity
by its members. Although slavery has ravaged the institutional
structure of the Black community to such a degree that some sections
of the Black community have yet to recover, society has yet to redress
the effects of that period. Instead, society provides more prisons,
more police, and tougher sanctions. For Black defendants in
particular, criminal behavior is linked to the oppressed status of the
community. 90
C. Racist Police and African American Suspects
Most African Americans interact with the criminal justice system
through contact with the police. There is substantial evidence that
police specifically target African Americans for special investigation
and detention. David Harris observes:
Put in the simplest terms, the criminal justice system treats African
Americans and Hispanic Americans differently than it does whites.
This disparate treatment reaches... down to the first level of the
criminal justice process, the points at which police decide who they
will investigate, approach, stop, frisk, and ultimately arrest. Police
89. See David Dolinko, The Future of Punishment, 46 UCLA L Rev. 1719, 1719-
20 (1999) (describing the retreat from rehabilitation during the 1970s and the embrace
of retribution as "the leading philosophical justification" of punishment).
90. In fact, criminal behavior is an expected and desired outcome of the African
American community's subjugated position in America. Echoing a claim that is often
made by radical criminologists, Noel Richardson argues that an oppressed and crime-
ridden African American community is useful to the dominant white society in many
ways. According to Richardson:
Segments of these populations can be beneficial "economically [as social
capital], politically as evidence of the need for state control systems, [and
ideologically as] scapegoats for rising discontent." In other words, under
certain conditions, capitalist societies "derive benefits from maintaining a
number of visible and uncontrolled 'troublemakers' in their midst."
Richardson, supra note 59, at 197 (quoting Steven Spitzer, Toward a Marxian Theory
of Deviance, 22 Soc. Probs. 643, 645 (1975)) (alteration in original).
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are much more likely to stop African-American men than white
men.
91
In part, this is due to the fact that police officers, like many
Americans, believe crime has a Black face.' In the minds of many
police officers, if African Americans are stopped, detained, or
arrested, then, by default, criminals, or at least potential criminals, are
being stopped, detained, or arrested. 93 This belief in Black criminality
causes police departments to over-police African American
communities,94 seek to contain African Americans within high crime
areas, and disproportionately subject African Americans to so-called
"quality of life" policing.
Legally, police are able to detain individuals if they have reasonable
suspicion that the individuals are involved in criminal activity.96
Theoretically, the reasonable suspicion standard is not supposed to
allow detentions on the basis of a raw suspicion or hunch?9 Courts,
however, frequently allow stops that are based on little else.9s The
reasonable suspicion standard is so loose that it permits detentions to
be made with a great deal of discretion.99 With the exercise of this
discretion comes the possibility of abuse. Officers may stop Blacks
because of their own biases or their own suspicions or hunches.1t0 As
91. David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor
Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 Ind. L.J. 659, 679-80 (1994) [hereinafter Harris,
Factors]; see also David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic
Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 544, 546 (1997) [hereinafter Harris, Driving] ("[I1f past practice is any
indication, [police] will use the traffic code to stop a hugely disproportionate number
of African-Americans and Hispanics."); Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue
Encounters"-Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures:
Should Race Matter? 26 Val. U. L. Rev. 243, 250-62 (1991) (generally describing
pervasiveness and scope of excessive police stops of African American men).
92. According to Professor Sheri Johnson, "[t]here is substantial evidence that
many police officers believe minority race indicates a general propensity to commit
crime. The evidence further suggests the police weigh that belief in their decisions to
detain." Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 Yale L.J.
214, 236 (1983) [hereinafter Johnson, Race].
93. See David H. Bayley & Harold Mendelsohn, Minorities and the Police:
Confrontation in America 107 (1969) ("Policemen associate minority status with a
high incidence of crime, especially crimes against the person, with bodily harm to
police officers, and with a general lack of support for the police."); Harris, Driving,
supra note 91, at 571 (arguing that law enforcement officers believe race is a proxy for
a "higher probability of criminal activity").
94. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
96. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
97. See id. at 27.
98. See Johnson, Race, supra note 92, at 218-22 (examining uneven treatment of
cases in which courts have found reasonable suspicion to exist). The source of the
problem can be traced to the fact that reasonable suspicion, the basis for a detention,
remains an "elusive" concept. See id. at 216.
99. See id.
100. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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Professor David Harris has demonstrated from his study of reasonable
suspicion cases, being Black and poor means being stopped and
frisked." 1  When not stopped because of their race, African
Americans are stopped for reasons that are easy proxies for race or
which have a disparate impact on Black citizens." -
Another troubling practice is the use of racial profiles by the
police. 3  The explicit use of race factors to detain is unlawful."°
Although the police deny reliance on racial categories to decide whom
to stop, there is evidence that this is a common practice for police
departments.105
Even wvithout using racial profiles, a disproportionate number of
African Americans may be stopped, detained, and ultimately arrested
because police over-police Black neighborhoods 3 6 Police also spend
more time and resources in Black neighborhoods than circumstances
warrant. This is not a matter of the police meeting the needs of the
community and controlling crime. It is an instance of the police
repressing the community by conducting more stops and intimidating
and mistreating the residents of the communityY African Americans
are kept in their communities by police patrols, and harassment
ensues should they venture out of areas where the police think they
belong. "Quality of life policing" involves over-policing in areas
frequented by whites.10 Arguably, however, the police conduct is
directed at the homeless, young African American males, and other
undesirables.
Police bias against African Americans results in far greater numbers
of African Americans entering the criminal justice system and being
subject to its restraints.1 9 Detention and arrest by the police is the
slippery slope that sends African Americans into the maws of a
criminal justice system that treats them in a disparate fashion at every
point where discretionary judgments can be made.' 0
101. See Harris, Factors, supra note 91, at 679-80.
102. See Johnson, Race, supra note 92, at 237-41 (describing ways that officers may
detain a suspect based on illegitimate proxies for race).
103. See Cole, supra note 27, at 47-52 (describing racial profiling).
104. See Johnson, Race, supra note 92, at 237.
105. Several notorious cases have brought the practice of racial profiling to the
public eye, including well-publicized cases on Interstate 95 in Florida and Interstate
68 in Maryland. From the disclosures in these cases, it appears police detain large
numbers of African Americans with little or no justification. For a discussion of these
cases, see Cole, supra note 27, at 49-52; Harris, Driving, supra note 91, at 560-73.
106. See Maclin, supra note 91, at 250-52.
107. See id.
108. See Cole, supra note 27, at 44 (describing quality of life policing).
109. See Davis, Benign, supra note 44, at 1676.
110. See id. at 1675; Harris, Factors, supra note 91, at 679.
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II. PROSECUTORS AND THE OVERREPRESENTATION OF AFRICAN
AMERICANS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Prosecutors exercise significant discretion within the criminal justice
system."' In fact, prosecutors may exercise more discretion than any
other actor" 2 Prosecutors decide whom to charge,'1 3 what to charge
them with,114 and whether to strike a plea bargain."5 Prosecutors also
play some role in determining whether charges, once filed, are
dropped or reduced" 6 and whether defendants receive charge
enhancements for particular crimes." 7 Prosecutors have the ability to
recommend sentences that weigh strongly with judges and greatly
influence determining the actual sentence imposed." 8  Prosecutors
also influence the range of a potential sentence through selection of
the charge."9 With this significant discretion comes the potential for
discrimination. In study after study, evidence that prosecutors
discriminate against African Americans and other people of color has
been mounting. 2 1 Whether this discrimination is conscious or
unconscious does not matter. Arguably, the overrepresentation of
African Americans in the criminal justice system is due largely to the
actions of prosecutors. 2'
Prosecutorial bias is present at virtually every stage of the criminal
justice system. 22  At the initial charging stage, prosecutors treat
African Americans in racially disparate ways. Several researchers
111. See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of
Discretion, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 13, 20 (1998) [hereinafter Davis, Prosecution].
112. See id. at 25.
113. See id. at 21-24.
114. Seeid. at 21-22.
115. See id. at 25.
116. See Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 717, 749 & n.233 (1996).
117. See generally id. at 742 (discussing the trends toward enhanced prosecutorial
power).
118. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part 1, 76
Colum. L. Rev. 1059, 1065-66 (1976). Where sentencing guidelines have been
adopted, prosecutors exercise even more influence on the sentencing process. See
Misner, supra note 116, at 757-59.
119. See Misner, supra note 116, at 756.
120. See Davis, Benign, supra note 44, at 1679 ("[E]mpirical studies consistently
demonstrate that race does indeed affect prosecutorial decisions.").
121. See Davis, Prosecution, supra note 111, at 16-18, 25. Although Davis
acknowledges the critical role that prosecutors play in the perpetration of racial
discrimination in the criminal justice system, she does not call for African American
prosecutors to refrain from working as prosecutors. Instead, she argues that African
American prosecutors should use their discretionary power to eliminate racial
disparities in charging and sentencing. See id. at 50-53. Paul Butler also acknowledges
the role that prosecutors play in perpetuating racial injustice, but he also does not
suggest that because of that role African Americans should refuse employment as
prosecutors. See Paul Butler, Starr Is to Clinton as Regular Prosecutors Are to Blacks,
40 B.C. L. Rev. 705,708-14 (1999).
122. See Davis, Prosecution, supra note 111, at 16-17.
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have found prosecutors press charges against African Americans
more frequently than they do similarly situated whites.2' In a 1987
study of charging decisions by Los Angeles prosecutors, researchers
found that the prosecutors were significantly less likely to drop
charges during the initial screening against Hispanic and Black
defendants than against white defendants. 24 This was the case even
though the authors of this study used multiple regression analysis to
control for other, nonracial, factors that might have contributed to this
result such as prior record, use of a weapon, and the seriousness of the
charge.' 25
A 1985 study by Radelet and Pierce also found racial disparities in
prosecutorial charging decisions."n Radelet and Pierce reviewed over
one thousand homicide cases in Florida to determine whether
prosecutors upgraded or downgraded the initial assessment of severity
made by the police.27 Radelet and Pierce found that charging
decisions were affected by the race of both defendant and victim.12
Crimes involving white victims and African American defendants
were more likely to be upgraded by the prosecutor, while crimes
involving African American victims and white defendants were much
more likely to be downgraded. 29 Consequently, Radelet and Pierce
found that Black defendants faced more serious charges, more
vigorous prosecution, and higher sentences than similarly situated
whites.13
0
Myers and Hagan also found discrepancies in prosecution decisions
based on the race of the victim. 13' After reviewing 980 felony cases
brought in Indianapolis, Indiana, Myers and Hagan found that
prosecutors treated cases more seriously when the victim was white.'
In such cases, Indianapolis prosecutors were more likely to charge and
less likely to plea bargain than in cases involving non-white victims.'3
In addition to the decision whether to charge, prosecutors also have
significant discretion in determining what to charge. There is a vast
123. See Developments, supra note 27, at 1520.
124. See iL at 1526 n.20.
125. See id
126. See Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion
in Homicide Cases, 19 L. & Soc'y Rev. 587,615-19 (1985).
127. See id. at 600.
128. See id at 615-19.
129. See id at 601.
130. See id. at 615-19.
131. See Developments, supra note 27, at 1525 (citing Myers & Hagan, Private and
Public Trouble: Prosecutors and the Allocation of Court Resources, 26 Soc. Probs. 439,
441-47 (1979)).
132. See id
133. See id. A 1980 study by LaFree reached conclusions similar to those found by
Myers and Hagan. See id. at 1527. LaFree found that African American men who
committed sexual assaults against white women were more likely to receive more
severe sentences than other sexual assailants. See id. This study controlled for factors
such as age and prior record. See id. at 1527 n.24.
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array of criminal statutes from which to choose, and the same act can
often result in very different punishment depending on the precise
statute chosen. As stated above, there is evidence that prosecutors
charge cases involving Black defendants more harshly than those
involving white defendants." That is, given a range of potential
charges, prosecutors are more likely to choose more severe charges
when a Black offender is involved.135
Another way a disproportionate number of African Americans
enter into state control is through the juvenile justice system. 13 6
Prosecutors are more likely to charge African American youths with
juvenile infractions,137 more likely to treat these infractions more
seriously,138 and more likely to seek transfer of juvenile cases to adult
court when the offender is Black.'39 In California, African American
teens charged with crimes are over six times more likely to be tried as
adults than are white youths. 4°
After the initial charging decision in a homicide case, one of the
most significant ways that a prosecutor can enhance the charge is by
seeking the death penalty. Here again, evidence shows racial
discrimination on the part of prosecutors. Paternoster examined 300
murder cases involving an aggravated felony that prosecutors in South
Carolina reviewed.' 4 ' He concluded that race of the victim
determined the outcome in the vast majority of cases. 42 Prosecutors
were more likely to seek the death penalty for killers of white victims
than for killers of Black victims. 143  In completing his research,
Paternoster rejected the argument that the difference in the treatment
of killers of white and Black victims is an artifact of the way their
victims were killed.'" Thus, "[t]he claim that the apparent effect of
the victim's race actually reflects differences in the way whites and
134. See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text,
135. See Developments, supra note 27, at 1526.
136. See Simon I. Singer, Youthful Offender Status and the Reproduction of Juvenile
Justice Within Systems of Criminal Justice: The Case of William Shrubsall, 17 Buff.
Pub. Interest L.J. 107, 117 (1998-99).
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, The End of the Line: An
Empirical Study of Judicial Waiver, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 449, 453-54 (1996)
(noting that a juvenile's race may influence judicial waiver decisions). Criminal and
juvenile courts have concurrent jurisdiction over juvenile cases, and prosecutors have
discretion to use waivers in determining the appropriate forum. See id. at 450 n.4.
140. See Michael A. Fletcher, Calif. Minority Youth Treated More Harshly, Study
Says; Racial Disparities in Sentencing Clear, Authors Report, Wash. Post, Feb. 3, 2000,
at A16.
141. See Raymond Paternoster, Prosecutorial Discretion in Requesting the Death







[B]lacks come to be killed appears unsupported."'145
Several studies have been conducted which examined racial
disparities in sentencing. 46 A widely cited and respected sentencing
study was the 1983 study of Georgia death sentences conducted by
David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth." This
study, which was called "the most comprehensive analysis to date,"'
43
looked at over 133 death sentences imposed in Georgia over an eight
year period.1 49 After examining more than 230 factors that may have
influenced these sentences, the researchers concluded that race of the
victim was the determining factor in whether a sentence of death was
imposed.'50 The Baldus study showed that defendants who killed
white victims were 4.3 times more likely to receive a death sentence
than defendants who killed non-whites.' African American
defendants fared even worse: Black defendants who killed whites
were eleven times more likely to receive the death penalty than white
defendants who killed Blacks.15
A survey of Florida's twenty judicial circuits showed that only two
circuits were free of racial bias in the application of the state's
habitual offender law. 5 3 The survey found that an African American
was fifty percent more likely to be prosecuted as a habitual offender
than a white with a similar background.'
All of these studies sought to determine the influence of race as a
determinate of charging decisions and sentencing outcomes when
weighted against other factors.15  As stated above, the researchers
used multiple regression analysis to control for nonracial factors such
as prior record, use of a weapon, character of offense, or the victim's
145. Id
146. See Mann, supra note 27, 191-200 (describing sentencing studies and
summarizing their findings).
147. See David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An
Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 661 (1983)
(analyzing the effect of race on the imposition of death sentences in Georgia).
148. Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 Harv. L Rev. 1388, 1396 (1988) [hereinafter Kennedy,
McCleskey].
149. See Baldus et al., supra note 147, at 680.
150. See Kennedy, McCleskey, supra note 148, at 1397.
151. See id. at 1398.
152. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,286 (1987).
153. See Blacks Prosecuted More Often, Report Says, Miami Herald, Sept. 3, 1992,
at 2B.
154. See id; John D. McKinnon, Offender Law Carries Brand of Racial Bias,
Miami Herald, Sept. 23, 1992, at lB. A University of Miami law professor, Jonathan
Simon, found an even greater disparity of treatment between Black and white
offenders. See Manny Garcia, Study: Sentencing Law Favors Whites, Miami Herald,
May 25, 1994, at 2B. He found that African Americans were more than twice as likely
to receive more severe prison sentences under the habitual offender statutes than a
similarly situated white offender. See id.
155. See Developments, supra note 27, at 1525-29.
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prosecution preference. 15 6 Yet, the studies all concluded that race--
either race of the victim, race of the defendant, or both-mattered in
the ultimate sentencing outcome.57 Of course, objections could be
raised as to the statistical validity of these studies: arguments that the
multiple regression analysis was not complete enough, that not
enough factors were considered, or that statistical errors were made in
the calculations.158 But these types of objections are, for the most
part, hypothetical. 5 9 Detractors of these studies have not come
forward with precise indications of statistical error."6
Additional evidence of racial discrimination exists in other aspects
of the prosecution of crimes. Both Langan and Blumstein compared
crime incidence data with incarceration rates and determined that far
greater percentages of African Americans are convicted of crimes
than are involved in the commission of criminal acts. 6' Blumstein
compared arrest rates with imprisonment data. 6 In ten of eleven
offense categories, Blumstein found that African Americans were
imprisoned at a disproportionate ratio to arrest.' 63 Using 1991 data,
the disproportionality averaged twenty-four percent.' 64 Put another
way, of those arrested for the class of crimes reviewed, African
Americans had a twenty-four percent higher rate of imprisonment
than their white counterparts, an amount that is significantly greater
than one would expect by chance. 6 Langan disclosed a similar
disparity when he compared crime victims' survey data with
156. See id. at 1529 n.31; supra note 124-25 and accompanying text. For a specific
discussion of multiple regression analysis, see Developments, supra note 27, at 1529 &
n.31.
157. See Developments, supra note 27, at 1525-29.
158. See id. at 1529-31.
159. See id. at 1531.
160. See id. ("Until such specific statistical criticisms are made, the results of the
various studies essentially stand unchallenged."). Twenty-eight prominent studies of
racial discrimination in capital sentencing were subjected to exhaustive review by the
U.S. General Accounting Office ("GAO") in 1990. See U.S. General Accounting
Office, Death Penalty Sentencing: Research Indicates Pattern of Racial Disparities(1990). The GAO found:
In 82 percent of the studies, race of victim was found to influence the
likelihood of being charged with capital murder or receiving the death
penalty, i.e., those who murdered whites were found to be more likely to be
sentenced to death than those who murdered [B]lacks. This finding was
remarkably consistent across data sets, states, data collection methods, and
analytic techniques.... Legally relevant variables, such as aggravating
circumstances, were influential but did not explain fully the racial disparities
researchers found.
Id. at 5-6 (footnotes omitted).
161. See Davis, Benign, supra note 44, at 1682-83 (reviewing the findings of both
Langan's and Blumstein's study).
162. See Alfred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality of U.S. Prison Populations
Revisited, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 743, 746-47 (1993).
163. See id. at 747.
164. See Davis, Benign, supra note 44, at 1683.
165. See Blumstein, supra note 162, at 748-49.
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imprisonment rates."6 Langan reviewed reported assaults committed
in 1982 and found that twenty-two percent were committed by
African Americans, whereas fifty percent of those sentenced for
assaults in 1982 were African American. 67 Thus, the study revealed
an unexplained disproportionate rate of incarceration of twenty
percent.161
As Professor Angela Davis indicates, these rates of
disproportionality are profound. 69  In 1994, there were 735,000
African Americans in prison. 17 Using twenty percent as the average
unexplained disparity in rate of incarceration, Davis points out that in
1994 this would have resulted in 147,000 African Americans who may
have been incarcerated due to racial bias in the criminal process.171 As
she states, this "is a staggering number."'" Yet, the calculations of
Langan and Blumstein have led to little reform in the criminal justice
system or in the behavior of prosecutors.7'
A. The Reaction of Prosecutors to Evidence of Racial Inequity
There is compelling, if not convincing, evidence of racial
discrimination in the criminal justice system. Many Americans, white
and Black, believe the criminal justice system is biased.74 Given the
prosecutor's duty to avoid the appearance of impropriety, prosecutors
as a group should take steps to eliminate, or at least explain, the
sources of perceived or actual bias in the criminal justice system.
Insofar as the allegations point to racist or biased prosecutorial
decisions, prosecutors should correct these sources of bias as quickly
as possible.
For the most part, however, the response of prosecutors has been to
wrap themselves in a blanket of denial. Recently, a locally elected
166. See Patrick A. Langan, Racism on Trial New Evidence to Erplain the Racial
Composition of Prisons in the United States, 76 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 666, 676-78
(1985). For a summary of the findings of the Langan study, see Davis, Benign, supra
note 44, at 1683.
167. See Davis, Benign, supra note 44, at 1683.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 1683-84.
171. See id at 1683.
172- Id, see also Russell, The Color of Crime, supra note 27, at 31 (reviewing
Blumstein study and concluding racial disparities found by Blumstein represent an
"enormous social problem").
173. Indeed, Davis demonstrates in her article that criminologists tend to ignore
these figures. See Davis, Benign, supra note 44, at 1683 (pointing out that Tonry views
racial bias as a relatively small problem in the criminal justice system, despite an
unexplained 20% disproportion between crimes committed and convictions for
African American men).
174. An American Bar Association poll conducted in 1998 showed that 47% of
respondents "strongly disagreed" with the statement that "the courts treat all ethnic
and racial groups the same." Many Perceive Racial Bias in Courts, Poll Indicates, Fort
Worth Star Telegram, Feb. 24, 1999, at 6.
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prosecutor flatly stated to a panel at the University of Florida that
there was no racial bias in prosecutorial decision making.175 Though
prosecutors assert that there is no racial bias in the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, they have done little to verify this belief, or
dispel the concerns of others. Prosecutors have rarely commissioned
studies, promulgated internal guidelines, or made attempts to keep
voluntary statistics on prosecutorial racial bias.176 Few prosecutors
have taken it upon themselves to maintain a dialogue on these issues
within their offices. There is little effort to sensitize prosecutors or
provide diversity training1 7
Even more disappointing than the lack of prosecutorial effort to
determine the extent of racial bias in prosecutorial decision-making, is
that prosecutors actively oppose the efforts of others to do so.
Prosecutors have vehemently opposed legislative attempts to gather
information regarding bias in the imposition of death sentencing and
in automobile stops.1 7
175. See State Attorney for the Eighth Jud. Dist. of Fla., Rod Smith, Address at the
Fla. Law Found. Pub. Serv. Law Fellows Symposium, University of Florida College of
Law (Feb. 2, 1995) (transcript on file with author).
176. In reaction to charges of racial bias, a few prosecutors' offices have conducted
studies investigating such charges. Two Florida prosecutors conducted studies of
their habitual sentencing records in response to allegations in a study commissioned
by the state legislature that "[B]lacks were three times more likely than whites to get
longer sentences under habitual-offenders laws." Prosecutors Deny Bias in
Sentencing: The State Attorneys Fault a Legislative Study for Giving the Wrong
Impression of Habitual Offender Cases, Orlando Sentinel, Apr. 13, 1993, at B5. One
prosecutor's survey found no bias, while the other found Blacks were only twice as
likely to receive habitual offender status. See id. Another prosecutor's office
conducted a study in 1993, the results of which were highly criticized. See Ed
Housewright, DA's Study on Bias in Courts Angers FW Black Leaders, Dallas
Morning News, Jan. 21, 1994, at 21A. The study, commissioned by the Tarrant
County Texas District Attorney's office, was prompted by "public outrage over the
10-year probationary sentence that avowed white supremacist Christopher Brosky
received ... for his part in the racially motivated slaying of a [B]lack man." Id. The
study reviewed 2700 Tarrant County felony cases and concluded:
While there is evidence indicating that minorities and males are more likely
to have prior records, to have legal status at the time of arrest, and to
commit more severe crimes, there is little to suggest that race or gender
influences the setting of bail, the likelihood of conviction, or the length of
incarceration.
Id. (quoting report of study).
177. Only in the most serious cases do prosecutors seek sensitivity training.
Tarrant County, Texas, prosecutors underwent sensitivity training only after protests
and demonstrations across the county. See id. The community was angered by the
lenient sentence of probation received by a former skin-head for his role in the hate
killing. See Selwyn Crawford, Tarrant DA, Staff to Undergo 'Sensitivity Training:'
Curry Responds to Concerns About Handling of Racial Slaying Case, Dallas Morning
News, Apr. 7, 1993, at 40A; see also Robin D. Barnes, Blue by Day and White by
[K]night: Regulating the Political Affiliations of Law Enforcement and Military
Personnel, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1079, 1091-98 (1996) (discussing "[tihe [diangers [p]osed
by Klan-[c]ops").
178. See, e.g., Tom Hester, Del Tufo, Prosecutors Urge Reform, The Star Ledger,
June 18, 1991, at 11 (reporting prosecutors oppose "a state Supreme Court-sponsored
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What prosecutors have done in response to the problem, if they
recognize one at all, is to seek to hire more African American
prosecutors.179 This is an inadequate response to the problem. There
are two potential rationales for the selection of African American
prosecutors as a solution to real or perceived racial discrimination in
the criminal justice system. One is that the presence of African
American prosecutors could operate as a check against conscious or
unconscious bias in the system. To the extent that African American
prosecutors make charging and other prosecutorial decisions, it is not
unreasonable to expect these decisions to be free from anti-Black
bias.ls The mere presence of Black prosecutors could discourage
others from behaving in ways that are racially discriminatory, either
because they are inhibited from acting in a consciously racially biased
way or because through interaction with African American
prosecutors they become more attuned to their own racial bias.' ,,
A far less justifiable reason to hire African American prosecutors is
to use them as a smoke screen for enduring discrimination. For
example, an office might hire an African American so that any
discriminatory practices would seem less objectionable because an
African American was present. Such an approach would be mere
tokenism. Unfortunately, it appears that tokenism is the intent
behind most prosecutors' actions with respect to hiring practices.'2
III. "AM I MY BROTHER'S KEEPER?": AFRICAN AMERICAN
PROSECUTORS AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS TO THE BLACK
COMMUNITY
Although the professional responsibility texts do not state as much,
I believe that African American attorneys have obligations that
study intended to ferret out institutional racism" through a "proportionality review").
179. See Johnson, More Black, supra note 8 ("[R]ecruiters hope that hiring more
minority prosecutors will help dispel the distrust some minorities-particularly
[B]lacks-have of the criminal-justice system."); Kirk Loggins, Six Minority Lawyers
on Johnson's Staff, The Tennessean, Mar. 13, 1998, at 6B (quoting a district attorney's
expression of hope that hiring more minority lawyers will make minority victims and
witnesses feel "more comfortable").
180. In general, this is not an unreasonable expectation, but self-hatred and
pressures to conform to the norms of the office may lead to decisions as biased as
would be made by non-[B]lack prosecutors.
181. See Constance Johnson, Black Prosecutors: Balancing the Scales, Black
Elegance, Mar. 19, 1998, available in LEXIS, New American News Service database
[hereinafter Johnson, Black Prosecutors] ("Many believe that having more [Bilacks as
prosecutors is a good insurance policy against racism."); E.R. Shipp, The Law, At the
Bar, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1988, at B6 (quoting a former Black prosecutor's statement
that "your mere presence in the office sometimes makes them more accountable").
182. Most prosecutors who address this question publicly state that the reason they
are searching for African American attorneys is merely to address public perceptions
that racism exists in the office. See Johnson, More Black, supra note 8. Such concern
for appearances in the absence of concrete efforts to detect and control sources of
racial bias is disappointing.
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extend beyond, and in some cases trump, the ethical obligations they
hold as attorneys. David Wilkins has written extensively about this
proposition.83 African Americans have an obligation to each other
because of their shared group membership.'1 4 Many in the white
majority have a problem with this proposition."8 Most of the white
commentary on race, which includes claims to colorblindness and the
like, is grounded in the refusal to recognize African people as a bona
fide group.'86 The white majority apparently thinks that by refusing to
recognize us, we will no longer exist. This is no mere disagreement.
This is an exercise of dominion and power in order to keep Blacks in
their place." Non-recognition is a device of control. 188
When African Americans band together, assert their identity, and
claim space and a right to existence, it is a revolutionary act. 89 This
banding together undermines existing narratives of authority and
privilege, and it responds to those who have actively and consciously
183. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment: Should a
Black Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1030, 1035 (1995)
[hereinafter Wilkins, Race, Ethics] (acknowledging that the interests of the Black
community may weigh against representing the Klan); David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to
the Mountaintop? The Role of Legal Education in Shaping the Values of Black
Corporate Lawyers, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1981, 1983-84 (1993) [hereinafter Wilkins, Two
Paths] (arguing that African American corporate lawyers have moral obligations to
fight racism and to aid less fortunate Blacks).
184. See Wilkins, Two Paths, supra note 183, at 1984-85. Professor Wilkins refers
to this assertion as the "obligation thesis." Id. at 1984. The obligation thesis posits
that African Americans "have moral obligations running to the [B]lack community
that must be balanced against other legitimate professional duties and personal
commitments when deciding on particular actions and, more generally, when
constructing a morally acceptable life plan." Id. In addition, Professor Wilkins
describes the obligation thesis as "a historically and contextually bounded obligation
on the part of relatively advantaged members of a particular disadvantaged group to
take account of the legitimate interests of other group members." Id. at 1995-96.
185. See Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 Duke L.J. 758, 759 ("[E]xplicit
[African] race consciousness has been considered taboo for at least 15 years within
mainstream American politics and for far longer within the particular conventions of
law and legal scholarship.").
186. See id. at 771 (arguing that the extreme integrationist position posits hope that
"'ethnic identity will become a thing of the past').
187. See Asa G. Hilliard, III, SBA: The Reawakening of the African Mind 27 (rev.
ed. 1998) (arguing that racist attacks on the African American community are
attempts to "prevent the reemergence of ethnic consciousness among Africans and
thereby prevent the unity that will lead to mobilization and resistance to
oppression").
188. See Robert Staples, Introduction to Black Sociology 261 (1976) (arguing that
racial non-recognition is "mostly an attempt by Whites to maintain institutional
arrangements which embody the residual results of past overt racism").
189. See Amilcar Cabral, National Liberation and Culture, in Return to the Source:
Selected Speeches of Amilcar Cabral 39, 43 (African Information Serv. ed., 1973)
("[I]f imperialist domination has the vital need to practice cultural oppression,
national liberation is necessarily an act of culture.") (emphasis in original); Hilliard,
supra note 187, at 26 ("Our survival as a people is connected to our unwavering
identification as Africans."); Khan, supra note 28, at 120-24 (describing the
revolutionary potential of identity formation).
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sought the destruction of the Black community with the retort that
"we are still here." It is defiant and angry and proud-as it should
be.19 Thus, claiming identity is more than an objective comment on
reality. It is an act of consciousness. The development of group
consciousness, of beginning to interpret the world in a way that draws
a distinction between one's group and the rest of humanity, draws one
closer to that group and creates a sense of belonging.1 91 Belonging
leads to allegiance.' 9 The development of group consciousness in this
sense contributes to the group's struggle for independence and
freedom from oppression.193  Belonging leads to a common
understanding of the political struggle of the group19, It produces an
awareness of one's role in the world and a common defense against
oppressive forces'95 that would, arguably, wipe the oppressed peoples
of the world off of the face of the planet. This awareness is why
oppressed groups find solidarity with each other and, as their
consciousness grows, they find it with other oppressed groups.
Oppressed people understand they are targets and that, like the
homeless, their very presence disturbs. As members of a targeted
group they draw together, naturally, instinctively and indeed,
rationally.'96 Each member of the group, however, expects the others
to shoulder some of the burden of a mutual defense.'9 Therefore,
membership in the group brings obligations. These obligations are
grounded in morality, because ultimately they are grounded on the
moral imperative to fight oppression. s98
African Americans fit this category of oppressed persons. African
Americans constitute a distinct cultural group with an ancient
190. See Sekou Toure, A Dialectical Approach to Culture, in Contemporary Black
Thought: The Best From the Black Scholar 3, 8 (Robert Chrisman & Nathan Hare
eds., 1973) ("For us, to speak of culture is to fight.").
191. See Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural
Identity, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 303,306-09 (1986). "In defining ourselves, we rely heavily on
other's view of us, real or imagined, and on our own connections with others." Id. at
307.
192. As members of oppressed communities develop a new sense of identity,
psychic benefits accrue: "With this new sense of identity, the oppressed begin to treat
each other with kindness. A feeling of solidarity permeates the group, creating bonds
of mutual affection, care, and belonging." Khan, supra note 28, at 120.
193. See Karst, supra note 191, at 327-28 (describing "defensive identification" as
helpful to self-protection and the pursuit of political goals).
194. See id at 328.
195. See id at 327-28.
196. See Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-
Baby-LatCrit Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 10 La Raza LJ. 499, 515 (1998)
(arguing that prejudice and random racial violence contribute to "a sense of solidarity
among all [B]lack people").
197. Karst asserts that "'[d]efensive identification with an ethnic or religious group
has always been a major source of cultural pluralism in America; the victims of
domination become bound together in a community."' Karst, supra note 191, at 326.
198. See Khan, supra note 28, at 116 (arguing that the subjugated are morally
empowered to use "any means necessary" to fight oppression).
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history.199  African Americans are an oppressed people whose
condition brings them together, binds them, and obligates them to one
another.200 Every African American does not, and need not, claim
membership in the African American community. The right to claim
one's identity is personal. But those who do choose to belong, also
assume a responsibility to advance the interests of the group. 01
African Americans acquire this responsibility to further the
interests of the group from another source as well. African
Americans are indebted to their group because they benefit from the
struggles that African Americans have endured before them .2
African American prosecutors would not be prosecutors were it not
for the civil rights revolution that opened these positions up to Black
applicants. In addition they would not have their jobs were it not for
the vocal Black constituencies in their communities who have cajoled,
threatened, and politically rewarded prosecutors for maintaining
diverse staffs. Moreover, it is doubtful whether, absent the efforts,
struggle, and commitment of other African Americans, these Black
prosecutors would ever have gotten into law school or received any
education. The benefits Black attorneys received as a result of their
community's efforts creates an obligation to give back."3
How should this obligation be performed? African American
prosecutors have two duties to the African American community.
The first, to paraphrase the physician's oath, is to do no harm.20
African American prosecutors have a duty to avoid causing harm to
the African American community.2°5 This is not an unusual duty for a
prosecutor to have. All prosecutors are expected to consider the
interest of the community. African Americans and other people of
color may not be able to have their interests protected by white
prosecutors.206 Thus, African American prosecutors must do so. In
199. Professor Wilkins argues that, first of all, the African American community is
a concrete reality, for "despite all of our many differences, [B]lack Americans
continue to be joined by an identifiable common culture that overlaps with, but is
distinct from, mainstream American culture." Wilkins, Two Paths, supra note 183, at
1997. Given this reality, one that for many African Americans "constitute[s] an
important source of strength and well-being," African Americans should nurture and
carefully tend the "bonds of solidarity and community" they share with other Black
people. Id. at 1999-2000.
200. See id.
201. See id. at 2000.
202. See id. at 2000-01. Furthermore, Wilkins argues that the moral duty to assist
the African American community extends even to those African Americans who
choose not to claim an African identity. See id. at 2001-02.
203. See id. at 2001-02.
204. See Michael Kowalski, Applying the "Two Schools of Thought" Doctrine to the
Repressed Memory Controversy, 19 J. Leg. Med. 503, 505 (1998) ("Primum non
nocere (first do no harm) is a phrase recognized as one of the most significant
admonitions from the Hippocratic Oath.").
205. See Wilkins, supra note 183, at 2010-11.
206. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
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any event, African American prosecutors should prevent harm from
happening to the African American community. This means that they
should do no harm themselves and that they should prevent others
from doing harm. This duty to prevent harm includes refusing to be
used by others as a tool for harming the African American
community. In other words, African Americans should not allow
themselves to be used as tokens' or as a smokescreen for
oppression.m
A common strategy for controlling subjugated populations is
through divide and conquer policies.209 It is not unusual for certain
members of oppressed communities to receive fairly significant
latitude and privilege." These people are often used as a means to
stymie social criticism and political resistance. They are also relied
upon to mediate relationships because they form a barrier between
the oppressed and the oppressors. They may be more efficient at
oppression than the oppressors themselves because they know the
community and because as beneficiaries of the process they have a
stake in insuring its success.'
African Americans also have an affirmative duty to aid the African
207. Paul Butler, an ex-federal prosecutor, says that tokenism is a "real dilemma"
that Black prosecutors must face. See Paul Butler, Brotherman: Reflections of a
Reformed Prosecutor, in Darden Dilemma, supra note 10, at 11.
208. See Wilkins, Two Paths, supra note 183, at 2002. Wilkins presents an example
of how African American lawyers can be used to mask ongoing oppression:
No matter how much [a Black] lawyer protests that his race is irrelevant to
the performance of his professional role, his very presence at the counsel
table sends a message to the jurors (both [B]lack and white) about the merits
of the discrimination claim. To the extent that this implicit message (i.e., a
company that discriminated would not hire a [B]lack lawyer) helps the
company defeat a valid claim of discrimination, the [B]lack lawyer has
helped inflict a moral wrong on the [B]lack plaintiffs.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
209. See Espinoza & Harris, supra note 196, at 554 n.184 ("'[Divide and conquer'
is... one of the oldest chapters in the book of oppression.").
210. Such largess rarely comes without strings attached, as the following passage
reveals:
[B]lacks who conform to the expectations of the white community-either
by pursuing careers in mainstream fields such as corporate practice, or by
openly defying the perceived or express wishes of other [B]lacks-often
receive substantial rewards. Careers in the mainstream hold out the promise
of all the money and status traditionally flowing to those in proximity to
wealth and power. As I indicated above, criticizing other [BIlacks also has
been known to improve the professional standing and personal wealth of
those [B]lacks perceived as willing to challenge the prevailing orthodoxy
within the [B]lack community.
Wilkins, Straightacketing, supra note 21, at 805-06; see also Wilkins, Race Ethics,
supra note 183, at 1066 (demonstrating that criticizing other Blacks can bring
acclaim).
211. See Stokely Carmichael & Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power The Politics of
Liberation in America 10 (1967) ("[T]he white power structure rules the [BIlack




American community, in addition to an obligation to prevent harm to
the African American community. As Professor Wilkins points out,
this duty to aid must be situated in a context that is limited and
defined by the lawyer's professional obligations and personal goals. 212
Consequently, African American prosecutors should aid Black
victims, witnesses, and defendants when doing so does not undermine
the legitimacy of the process or otherwise conflict with legitimate
professional or ethical constraints.213
IV. RESOLVING "DARDEN'S DILEMMA": CAN BLACK
PROSECUTORS STEM THE TIDE?
In certain ways the presence of African American prosecutors is an
advantage to the African American community. Black prosecutors
provide African American representation in important public
positions.214 An extreme representation position argues that African
Americans should be represented in all institutions in American
society and at all levels.21 5 This argument is, essentially, integrationist
in orientation.2 6 It asserts that African American representation is
important because there are no places in society that African
Americans should not be.217 A less extreme version of this argument
asserts that African Americans should be represented in any
institution that is important to the goals and aspirations of the African
American community.21 s
212. See David B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition, and
Professional Responsibility, 57 Md. L. Rev. 1502, 1550 (1998) [hereinafter Wilkins,
Identities and Roles]. According to Wilkins:
Black lawyers simultaneously inhabit [three] moral domains: the
"professional," representing the legitimate demands that accompany their
professional status as lawyers; the "obligation thesis," representing the
legitimate moral commitments that [BIlack lawyers owe to the African
American community; and, for want of a better term, the "personal"
universe, representing the inherent right of every [B]lack lawyer to pursue
her own unique projects and commitments.
Id.
213. Thus, while African American prosecutors should not treat African American
defendants better than white defendants, the duty to aid, arguably, would require
them to assist an African American defendant who is eligible for, and would benefit
from, an alternative sentencing program.
214. See Johnson, Black Prosecutors, supra note 181 (quoting the statement of a
Black prosecutor that "'Black people are starting to believe that you've got to be
involved in every aspect of the criminal justice system, if there's ever going to be any
justice."').
215. See id.; Peller, supra note 185, at 770 (describing integrationists as those
seeking the dual goals of equal treatment for individuals and the integration of
institutions).
216. See Peller, supra note 185, at 770.
217. See id. Peller also describes another view of integration that advocates "the
creation of a 'creole' institutional and public culture that would contain within itself
the elements of composite cultures." Id. at 818.
218. See Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the
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The prosecutor's office occupies an important, politically
prestigious position. African Americans should certainly be
represented in this office. To the extent that individual African
Americans gain political and social stature, as prosecutors, then so
much the better.
Plainly, assuring the safety and well-being of the African American
community is an important goal. To the extent that individual African
American attorneys can assure that the prosecutorial power of the
state is used to protect the African American community from
violence, fraud, drugs, etc., this is unobjectionable. 9 In some ways,
the presence of African American attorneys can make the office more
effective. Black prosecutors may be more persuasive with African
American jurors, may find it easier to relate to witnesses and
informants in African American communities, and may be able to
gauge the value of a given case when the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion is called for. But these advantages are at best theoretical.
Whether a prosecutor is able to accomplish these goals within a given
prosecutors office is questionable. The effectiveness of individual
prosecutors as social change agents is constrained by limitations on
the prosecutor's role and by both internal and external pressures on
the individual prosecutor.
First of all, Black prosecutors struggle with the same issues of job
fairness and equality that African American professionals in other
walks of life face.' They simply may not be able to do their jobs
effectively, or they may face debilitating stresses as they attempt to do
so. More importantly, as I indicated above, there are limits to how
Affirmative Action Debate, 99 Harv. L Rev. 1327, 1331 (1986) (asserting that
affirmative action can be justified because "[t]he presence of [B]lacks across the
broad spectrum of institutional settings upsets conventional stereotypes"). Another
related integrationist justification holds that, in a truly integrated society, African
Americans would have the same range of personal and career opportunities as
everyone else. See Wilkins, Two Paths, supra note 183, at 1986.
219. For these reasons, Wilkins supports the presence of African Americans in
prosecutors' offices. See Wilkins, Straightiacketing, supra note 21, at 803 n.38 (calling
the charge that Black prosecutors invariably work against racial justice "speculative"
and "contingent," and claiming "there are strong arguments that [BIlack
prosecutors-either by watching out for racism in the prosecutor's office, or by
preventing criminals ... from preying on the [B]lack community-promote the cause
of racial justice").
220. See Naftali Bendavid, Race, Hope, and Eric Holder; Some Black A USAs Say
Expectations for Advancement Have Remained Unfidfilled, Legal Times, Apr. 18,
1996, at 1 (reporting the continued existence of discrimination within the District of
Columbia U.S. Attorney's Office, even while an African American served as the U.S.
Attorney); Elliot Pinsley, Black Prosecutors Upset Over Harlem Transfers, Manhattan
Lawyer, May 1990, at 1 (observing allegations by some Black prosecutors that
personnel moves are discriminatory) Elliot Pinsley, Minority DAs See Few
Opportunities; Morgantlau Staff is 17% Minority But Not Many Supervise, Manhattan
Lawyer, Dec. 19, 1989, at 1 (noting the low percentage of minorities in positions of
power at the Manhattan DAs office).
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effective traditional crime fighting strategies can be.22 In the long
haul, a Black prosecutor's presence in the prosecutor's office may
have a marginal impact on the amount of crime that takes place in the
Black community. Thus, the value of a Black prosecutor to the Black
community is relative to the amount of good he or she could do as a
public interest lawyer or legal aid attorney working on the root causes
of crime.'
All prosecutors face social, professional and political pressures to
conform their decisions to social expectations. African American
prosecutors are no different.
Ideally, African American prosecutors would be expected to
provide protection from oppression to African American defendants
and the African American community generally. As indicated above,
African American prosecutors could work to change the dynamic in
the office, so that conscious or unconscious racism would not infect
prosecutorial decisions. But while Black prosecutors would strive to
have a positive effect on the offices where they worked, the office
environment might negatively impact on their ability to effect
change. 2  The office might seek to employ African Americans with
less African consciousness and lower levels of racial identification.224
Once in the office, the Black prosecutor might be subject to significant
social pressure to conform and "be one of the team. ' '225  Black
221. See supra notes 71-86 and accompanying text.
222. Wilkins makes a similar point in reference to whether African Americans
should work as corporate attorneys. See Wilkins, Two Paths, supra note 183, at 1986-
93. Although he concludes that African American corporate attorneys are desirable,
he points out that to evaluate the social worth of corporate practice, African
Americans must consider both the harm that corporate practice may inflict directly on
the African American community and the opportunity missed to apply legal talent to
pressing problems and concerns in the Black community. See id.
223. Professor Wilkins explains that because the legal system has made a formal
commitment to equal justice:
[A]rguments about race in the courtroom appear to many whites to be out of
place. This intuition, however, conflates the legal system's commitment to
the ideal of colorblind adjudication with the factual assertion that this ideal
has been met in practice. As a result, attorneys are under pressure to
suppress or deny instances in which race affects the administration of justice.
Wilkins, Straightjacketing, supra note 21, at 802.
224. There is no inherent reason why African American prosecutors cannot exhibit
racist behavior. For example, African American prosecutors may rely on
stereotypical criteria in selecting jurors. See Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas,
Babies, Bathwater, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes: The African-American Woman
and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 1003, 1072-73 n.250 (detailing
how an African American prosecutor excused a Black female juror using
stereotypical criteria, for he argued that he excused three challenged jurors because of
"braids, obesity, [a]nd size" explaining that "[y]oung, obese [B]lack women are really
dangerous to me").
225. Black prosecutors are under pressure to be "hard-line" to fit into the
expectations of the office. See Susan Skiles, Black Prosecutors Say They Face Unique
Problems, Chi. Daily L. Bull., Aug. 28, 1991, at 1. For instance, Black prosecutors
may find it difficult to pursue police brutality cases or be lenient on Black defendants.
[Vol. 681506
THE DARDEN DILEMMA
prosecutors might find that, because they are at the lower levels in the
office, there is little autonomy and independence. Thus, a Black
prosecutor might be unable to make much of a difference, even if he
or she desires.
The prosecutor is considered the chief authority responsible for
ensuring adherence to the law and thereby maintaining peace and
order in society. As such, many in society view the prosecutor as a
valued public servant deserving admiration and respect.' As I stated
elsewhere:
Prosecutors have prestige not only because they are attorneys but
also because they are representatives of the state. Prosecutors trade
on the authority of the state. [In] the eyes and ears of the jury, it is
"the state" that rests, "the government" that alleges, or "the people"
that object[s]. The prosecutor, then, is not just some employee of
the government; the prosecutor is the alter ego of the state-the
government personified. To the extent that the state engenders
authority, power, and respect, so too then does the prosecutor.
-m
Some African Americans may seek employment at the prosecutors'
office in order to gain prestige and influence. As a result, some
prosecutors will be particularly susceptible to pressure to engage in
behavior that will earn the approval of society at large.? Indeed, for
Black prosecutors, the pressure to conform to white standards will far
exceed any pressure they may feel to maintain racial solidarity.' As
Wilkins suggests, "[c]areers in the mainstream hold out the promise of
all the money and status traditionally flowing to those in proximity to
wealth and power"' and Blacks "who conform to the expectations of
See id.
226. In particular, those who benefit from the established order, and would like to
see that order endure, tend to view the prosecutor and the prosecutor's role
favorably.
227. Nunn, Trial as Text, supra note 57, at 787 (footnote omitted). Arguably, the
higher pay and resources afforded to prosecutors versus defense attorneys further
demonstrates the high regard that society has for prosecutors. See id. at 809-13.
228. Indeed, there are strong reasons to believe African American prosecutors
would be subject to the same "false consciousness" that Lani Guinier suggests
severely limits the effectiveness of African American elected officials. See Lani
Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and tile Theory of Black
Electoral Success, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1077, 1119 (1991). According to Guinier:
Once assimilated into the political mainstream, [B]lack officials may define
their political agenda without reference to or consultation with a community
base. Their reference point may instead become other members of the
governing elite with whom they share personal experiences and comparable
"rank." With access to prestige rather than power, some [B]lack politicians
may simply censor themselves in order to "play ball" ....
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Kenneth B. Nunn, Law as a Eurocentric Enterprise,
15 Law & Ineq. J. 323, 367-69 (1997) [hereinafter Nunn, Law] (arguing that the
hierarchical nature of the legal system undermines the political consciousness of
African American lawyers and judges).
229. See Wilkins, Straightiacketing, supra note 21, at 805-06.
230. Id (footnote omitted).
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the white community-either by pursuing careers in mainstream fields
such as corporate practice, or by openly defying the perceived or
express[ed] wishes of other [B]lacks-often receive substantial
rewards. "31
A Black prosecutor also will be subject to the same social forces
that cause all politicians to genuflect before the criminal justice alter.
Resisting the "lock them up and throw away the key-especially if
they are Black" mentality takes an extraordinary amount of strength
and commitment. If Black prosecutors assert that position they will
have problems with the political establishment, the police, and
prominent citizens. They will not be prosecutors for long.
Regardless of their motivations for joining the office, African
American prosecutors must seek to preserve the existing order. In
doing so, the Black prosecutor must defend the order and its
legitimacy. Thus, the African American prosecutor is under pressure
not to speak out on racial injustice. Black prosecutors are likely to
deny that racial injustice exists in the system, or to argue that its
influence and effect is limited. Like other African Americans who
seek advancement in white institutions, African American prosecutors
cannot engage in "open political or cultural activism without risking
their credibility or subjecting themselves to political or social
pressure. "32
For the role of Black prosecutors to be fully examined, their
cultural significance should be assessed. Black prosecutors make a
social statement by their very presence. Their mere presence may be
seen as evidence that racial discrimination does not exist in that
environment. They indicate that the criminal justice system is fair and
that there are no fundamental flaws in the way criminal law is applied
in America. This implication is problematic because it is not true.
Racism is rampant in the criminal justice system and prosecutors'
offices are to blame for a significant part of it.233 Black prosecutors,
thus, become a tool for the oppression of the African American
community. They become a buffer between the powerful interests
that control the criminal justice system and the African American
community.' They stand as an endorsement of the proposition that
social resources other than those used for criminal prosecution will
not be spent on oppressed communities. All of these things conflict
with the African American prosecutor's ethical and moral duty to
protect and assist the African American community.
Although some positive results come from the presence of Black
prosecutors, on the whole, Black prosecutors are smokescreens, that
obscure racial injustice. Prosecutors are simply not doing enough to
231. Id. at 805.
232. Nunn, Law, supra note 228, at 368.
233. See supra Part II.
234. See supra notes 209-11.
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eradicate the scourge of racism from the criminal justice system and
from society. Until they do, African Americans should refuse to serve
as prosecutors.
CONCLUSION
The presence of African American attorneys in prosecutors' offices
brings some undeniable benefits to the African American community.
Some, if not most, African American prosecutors seek to use their
positions to pursue justice and insure fairness to African American
victims, defendants, and the African American community at large.
But the independent attempts of African American prosecutors to do
justice one case at a time comes at a price. For, by their mere
presence, African American prosecutors insulate the criminal justice
system from charges of racism. From their tenuous position in the
criminal justice system, African American prosecutors can do little to
stem the racism that is endemic to the criminal justice process. This
fact creates a moral conflict between the interests of the African
American community and the professional obligations of the African
American prosecutor, a conflict which is the source of the "Darden
Dilemma."
As long as disturbing racial disparities edst in the criminal justice
system, as long as prosecutors' offices contribute to these racial
disparities through the discriminatory use of prosecutorial discretion,
and as long as obscenely huge numbers of African Americans are
incarcerated and warehoused in American prisons and jails, the
solution to the "Darden Dilemma" is clear. African Americans
should not prosecute crimes. They should not prosecute crimes in
order to avoid doing harm to the African American community, and
they should not prosecute crimes because their refusal to do so may
finally generate a public commitment to confront and change a
shamefully racist criminal justice system.
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